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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Supreme Court’s two wetlands cases in the 2005 Term, a
question of statutory interpretation divided the Justices sharply, in
part because so much rides on the particular statutory provision at
issue. The provision—a cryptic definition within the Clean Water Act
(CWA)1—has now provided three separate occasions for the Justices
to confront (1) the Chevron doctrine and the Court’s own ambivalence
toward it, and (2) the CWA’s enormous project of restoring the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters. In
this Article, I argue that the way the Court went about resolving its
differences is, unfortunately, not just instructive to environmental
lawyers. It is illustrative of the Court’s failed minimalism, disregard
for its own precedents, and tired use of semantics where truly substantive problems are confronting our society.
II. USING OLD CONCEPTS IN NEW LAWS
It is perhaps fitting that all three branches of government have
embarrassed themselves trying to define a concept central to American environmental law. In 1972, Congress declared in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, known as the Clean Water Act (CWA),
that it was “the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.”2 That, of course, never
* Professor, Western New England College School of Law. J.D., Rutgers University
School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School; J.S.D., Columbia University. The author would
like to thank Jay Austin, Bill Childs, Mike Dorf, and Lisa Goldman for helpful feedback on
an earlier draft.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816, 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2000)). It was Congress’s declaration be-
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happened—not least because Congress itself never really shared the
ambition of that goal. The statute’s longer-term objective of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”3 became, virtually by default, the most
definite end to which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the Corps of Engineers (Corps) could aim. But they have chosen
an irregular path to that end, partly because the statute is so equivocal about its purposes and its subject (section 502 (7) of the CWA defines its subject, “navigable waters,” as roughly “waters of the United
States”4) and partly because the courts have been so equivocal about
the statute’s meaning under our Constitution and practices of statutory construction.5 Great hopes had formed around Rapanos v.
United States and Carabell v. U.S. Corps of Engineers, the two wetlands cases on certiorari in the 2005 Term. But those hopes were
dashed in a 4-1-4 split at the Court that today threatens to make restoring the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s
waters even harder.6
When the Supreme Court decided Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),7 environmental
lawyers were sure the Court would have to return to the scene to
clarify what it had done.8 In SWANCC, the Court rejected the Corps’
interpretation of section 502(7)9 extending it to certain “nonnavigacause Nixon vetoed Pub. L. No. 92-500, but was immediately overridden. See 86 Stat. at
903-04.
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
4. Id. § 1362(7). The term “waters of the United States” is defined by both the Army
Corps of Engineers at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2006) and by the EPA at 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)
(2006). Because of its other, related statutes, the Corps also maintains a regulatory definition of “navigable waters of the United States.” See 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (2006). These two
agencies have built a relationship based upon mutual distrust, a function of their having
been granted a divided authority to implement the Act and of their different institutional
cultures. See Mark A. Chertok & Kate Sinding, Federal Jurisdiction over Wetlands: “Waters of the United States,” in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404,
59, 60-61 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005). Currently, the definitions parallel each
other in substance, although the two agencies’ interpretations and administration of the
term have been somewhat uneven over the years. See id. at 86-92.
5. This Article leaves aside the Corps’ own significant institutional ambivalence toward section 101(a) of the CWA. The history has yet to be written fully detailing the many
ways in which the Corps itself is responsible for compromising the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the nation’s waters. See MICHAEL GRUNWALD, THE SWAMP: THE
EVERGLADES, FLORIDA, AND THE POLITICS OF PARADISE (2006); ARTHUR E. MORGAN, DAMS
AND OTHER DISASTERS: A CENTURY OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN CIVIL WORKS
(1971).
6. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
7. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
8. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act After
SWANCC: Using a Hydrological Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 811 (2003).
9. The Corps interpreted sections 404 and 502(7) of the CWA (respectively codified at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 1362(7)) as including “waters” having principally biological—as op-
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ble, isolated, intrastate waters.”10 The Court held the waters were
beyond the reach of the CWA as legislated in 1972 and as amended
in 1977 and again in 1987.11 In reversing the Corps so bluntly, the
SWANCC majority advanced a view of regulatory federalism distinctly contrary to the one the agency had practiced. Indeed, the majority seemed to take jurisdictional geography far more seriously
than had the Executive—going so far as to reject a call for deference
that it might ordinarily have answered.12 By doing so, the Court also
showcased a view of its own authority that is at least in tension with,
if not flatly contrary to, several of its precedents—indeed with much
of the last half century of administrative law. This is what made
SWANCC so extraordinary a presence in environmental law for the
last five years—and what set the stage for the cases this Term.13
The SWANCC opinion left its legal geography mostly uncharted,
though, especially with respect to wetlands as “waters of the United
States.”14 Some wetlands are far removed—even completely detached

posed to hydrological—connections to traditional navigable-in-fact waters. See Mank, supra note 8, at 842-43.
10. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165-66, 174.
11. See id. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWCPA) took its modern, recognizable form through the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean
Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (2000)). It was the 1977 amendments that changed the statute’s official name to
the “Clean Water Act,” Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 2, 91 Stat. 1566,
1566, although it is still denominated FWPCA in the U.S. Code. The Water Quality Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987), was enacted less than a year after EPA and the
Corps issued the definition of “waters of the United States” challenged in SWANCC, doing
nothing to alter those definitions. See Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-30 (2006)).
12. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-74. The Court refused to afford the agencies the
level of deference identified with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-74. It held instead that an implied
exception to the Chevron doctrine exists where an agency interpretation of an ambiguous
statute has the potential to raise “ ‘serious constitutional problems.’ ” Id. at 172-73 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988)).
13. As Professor Lazarus argued,
[t]he SWANCC Court’s conclusion that the plain meaning of “navigable waters”
cannot extend to isolated, nonnavigable, intrastate waters not physically adjacent to waters satisfying what the Court described as the “classical understanding of that term” is not, standing alone, remarkable. To anyone approaching the question as a matter of first impression, the ruling might well seem
logical, if not compelling. What made the Court’s ruling so unsettling to environmental law was that the legal issue before the Court was not a matter of
first impression: the relevant federal agencies (and arguably Congress as well)
had embraced a view broader than that “classical understanding” for more
than twenty-five years.
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 204 (2004).
14. The majority in SWANCC held that for such “isolated” waters to be deemed “waters of the United States,” they had to bear some sort of “significant nexus” to navigable
waters traditionally defined. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 170.
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at long intervals15—from the “navigable waters” into which they
eventually and/or occasionally flow.16 The SWANCC opinion said
nothing about delineating federal as opposed to state jurisdiction
there.17 Not that this was especially novel: various navigation acts
have referenced “navigable waters” and their “tributaries” going back
decades, implying the existence of a set the courts have long struggled to identify.18
But the SWANCC case emphasized the point of the CWA—the
restoration of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
nation’s waters—intersecting most directly with the Court’s recent
federalism precedents. Hydrographic modifications are so common
today and the building of infrastructure that is impervious to precipitation is so widespread that wetlands protection and runoff regulation have become hot button social issues.19 Yet the natural capital
that functioning wetlands represent makes the test for Commerce
Clause authority articulated in United States v. Lopez20 and elsewhere21 no test at all. Destroying this resource is easily among
15. Dennis W. Magee, A Primer on Wetlands Ecology, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY:
UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404 27, 28-32 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804, 805 (7th Cir.
2005) (describing a long, attenuated path connecting the wetlands at issue to waters that
were navigable in fact), cert. granted and vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2964 (2006), remanded to 464
F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006). “Wetlands” have long been defined by the agencies as lands “that
are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2005). But
this definition encompasses swamp and cornfield alike. See United States v. Rapanos, 376
F.3d 629, 642-43 (6th Cir. 2004).
17. Thus, unlike Rapanos and Carabell, no “adjacency” issue was present in
SWANCC. Estimates vary, but with roughly 278 million acres of wetlands across the country, William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?,
55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 553 (2004), this was easily the most politically charged issue in
SWANCC. Together with the concept of a tributary, it then became the parade of horribles
in Justice Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208,
2214-19 (2006).
18. See, e.g., Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 633 (1900) (arguing that tributaries of “navigable in fact” waters cannot be “navigable waters of the United States” because
if they were “there is scarcely a creek or stream in the entire country which is not a navigable water of the United States”).
19. See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 30-35 (2003).
20. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
21. The Court has decided at least three significant challenges to federal statutes under the Commerce Clause since Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Perez upheld
Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act prohibiting “loansharking” as part of a larger program attacking organized crime and was the first opinion to set out the familiar
three-part test Lopez made so famous. Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 674, 702-03 & n.118 (1995). The three cases are Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). These
cases were part of a larger renaissance of states’ rights decisions under Chief Justice
Rehnquist. See Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 221-23 (2004).
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that “ ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.”22 Even “isolated” wetlands and their destruction most
certainly do “substantially affect” interstate commerce.23 So the question in Rapanos and Carabell was not whether Congress could authorize its agencies to regulate remote wetlands and tributaries; the
question was always whether it did do so in the CWA. It was solely a
question of statutory meaning.
It was a question more interesting and complex than any equivalent constitutional question, though, because it straddled the deepest
structural fissures running through most of our federal environmental and natural resource laws. The first law of ecology teaches
that no part of nature is really separate from another. Tributaries,
headwaters, and wetlands, known to conservation scientists as the
places “where rivers are born,”24 are integral to accomplishing the
CWA’s restorative objective.25 But their range across North America26

22. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17; cf. id. (“When Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of
a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”) (citation
omitted). In Lopez, the Court held that where the legislation regulates neither overtly
commercial activity nor the “channels” or “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce, it
may still regulate activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce and be a constitutional use of Article I authority. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. Some courts have expressly
analyzed the Commerce Clause issues raised by section 502(7) in terms of the protection of
the “channels” of interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001). Moreover, the
Court has long maintained that
[a] complex regulatory program . . . can survive a Commerce Clause challenge
without a showing that every single facet of the program is independently and
dirxectly related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged
provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole satisfies this test.
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981).
23. See, e.g., Elaine Bueschen, Do Isolated Wetlands Substantially Affect Interstate
Commerce?, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 931, 954-60 (1997).
24. JUDY L. MEYER ET AL., WHERE RIVERS ARE BORN: THE SCIENTIFIC IMPERATIVE FOR
DEFENDING
SMALL
STREAMS
AND
WETLANDS
5
(2003),
available
at
http://www.americanrivers.org/site/pageserver?pagename=AMR_publications#clean (follow
“Where Rivers Are Born: The Scientific Imperative for Defending Small Streams and Wetlands” hyperlink).
25. Magee, supra note 15, at 37-43. The Executive Branch has long maintained that
the CWA’s most basic objective is the restoration of the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the nation’s waters. See Administrative Authority to Construe § 404 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197, 197 (1979) (interpreting 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1311, 1344 as having a “basic objective” of restoring and maintaining the
“chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”). Justice Scalia twice
emphasized the statement in section 101(b) of the CWA that “ ‘[i]t is the policy of Congress
to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution.’ ” Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2215,
2223 (2006). No statute can intelligibly have as its goal some end that would be better
served by its nonexistence, though. Section 101(b) of the CWA is rather a proviso to the
Executive in how it goes about implementing the CWA. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 19.
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casts that objective into a federal mission of sweeping proportions
(almost as sweeping, in fact, as was the federal effort to fill and “reclaim” “swamps” prior to the 1970s).27 Such a mandate could, on the
courts’ understanding of the problem, swallow that most local of prerogatives, the “primary power over land . . . use.”28 Whatever its particular priorities, though, Congress has never asserted exclusive federal authority over natural resources29—direct testimony to the political safeguards of “our federalism.”30 The question presented to the
Court in Rapanos and Carabell was therefore two-fold: how geographically extensive is the CWA’s reach and who has the legal authority to say?
III. “WATERS” AND “NAVIGABLE WATERS”
Like most federal environmental statutes, the CWA has been profoundly influenced by legal cases testing the scope of the government’s prescriptive authority.31 Indeed, just like the Endangered
Species Act,32 the CWA employs a critical, jurisdiction-defining term
with an extraordinarily muddled legal pedigree.33 It has, one might
even say, invited such challenges from anyone with enough to lose to
motivate them into court. In 1972, Congress amended the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, a statute it had first legislated in 1948,
to make it into a more comprehensive, prescriptive, “federalizing”

27. See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson:
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL.
L. 1, 19-27 (1999).
28. SWANCC, 521 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (“ ‘[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments.’ ”) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson
Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)).
29. See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 179, 183-84 (2005).
30. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954).
31. On the central role litigation has played in shaping the CWA’s reach and substance, see ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER (1993).
32. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 84 (1973) (codified as
amended in 7 U.S.C. § 136 and scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
33. As the Court noted in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), the Endangered Species Act’s defined term “take” has
a long history of various definitions in the law, each with its own purposes. The statute’s
definition of “take” includes actions that “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)
(2000). The agencies’ regulatory definitions of the statute’s definitional terms “harm” and
“harass” include habitat modifications but were, themselves, at issue in Babbitt and like
cases. Many of those cases have come down to evidentiary doubts that some particular action does in fact “harm” or “harass” the listed species. See, e.g., Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996); Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50
F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir.
1994).
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statute.34 Cryptically, it took a program that had previously and
variously denoted its subject as “interstate waters,”35 “interstate or
navigable waters,”36 and “navigable waters of the United States,”37
and, in section 502(7), redefined its subject as “waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.”38 For over thirty years now this
demarcation of federal authority has taxed the legal system’s collective wits39 for the simple reason that the dignity afforded states in
“our federalism” colors statutes like the CWA exceptional, subjecting

34. Readers needing a history of the legislative evolution from 1948-1972 can do no
better than William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215
(2003).
35. The very first iteration of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in
1948 referenced “interstate waters” and defined them as “all rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across, or form a part of, State boundaries.” Pub. L. No. 80-845 § 10(e), 62
Stat. 1155, 1161 (1948). This extension of federal prescriptive authority was certainly narrower than the Congress’s Article I authority as then interpreted by the courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 569 (1939) (“Activities conducted
within state lines do not by this fact alone escape the sweep of the Commerce Clause. Interstate commerce may be dependent upon them.”).
36. The 1961 amendments provided a dilute remedy against the
pollution of interstate or navigable waters in or adjacent to any State or States
(whether the matter causing or contributing to such pollution is discharged directly into such waters or reaches such waters after discharge into a tributary
of such waters), which endangers the health or welfare of any persons.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, § 7, 75 Stat.
204, 208 (1961). The amendments did not define “tributary” or “navigable waters,” although they presumably did adopt the definition of “interstate waters” already a part of
the FWPCA.
37. The 1966 FWPCA amendments defined “navigable waters of the United States,”
“[w]hen used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,” to mean “all portions of
the sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and all inland waters navigable in fact.” Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, § 211, 80 Stat.
1246, 1252-53 (1966). It was this set of waters in the FWPCA that was referenced by the
Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Illinois v. Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the
Court’s famous interstate common law nuisance case over the sewage discharges to Lake
Michigan. See id. at 102 (“[T]he [FWPCA] makes clear that it is federal, not state, law that
in the end controls the pollution of interstate or navigable waters.”).
38. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 502(7), 86 Stat. 816, 885. The term “territorial seas” was itself defined to mean “the belt of the seas measured from the line of ordinary low water
along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line
marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and extending seaward a distance of three
miles.” Id. at § 502(8). In more than thirty years, Congress has never seen fit to clarify the
definition of “navigable waters” and, in fact, has actually incorporated it into other statutes. See Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that
section 1001(21) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was an intentional congressional adoption
of section 502(7) of the CWA, including conflicting judicial interpretations). As Professor
Mank has argued, it is still unlikely a congressional majority will materialize to change the
statute’s definition. See Bradford R. Mank, Implementing Rapanos—Will Justice Kennedy’s
Significant Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts, Regulators, and
Developers?, 40 IND. L. REV. 291, 346-47 (2007).
39. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, What Are “Navigable Waters” Subject to Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq.)?, 160 A.L.R. FED. 585 (Supp.
2005) (gathering cases with contrasting holdings on the extension of CWA jurisdiction).
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them to constant judicial scrutiny.40 The CWA, after all, famously
announces that “it is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.”41 Thus, the semantics of
section 502(7), and therefore the scope of the entire statute, seem to
invite interpretation and perhaps even misinterpretation. It is, after
all, not self-evident what real work is done by the definition of an expression that is just the expression itself minus a word. The Court
has found this invitation irresistible three times now, but its work
product has been less and less about grammar each time.
Article I authority to regulate waters that could be made navigable with improvements was established law well before the CWA.42
And as to regulated activities, federal authority had extended beyond
just the licensing of vessel traffic43 to the building of wharves, piers,
and other infrastructure;44 dredging and manipulating channels;45
and even to the complete destruction of the water’s navigability.46 But
the legal concept of “navigable waters” runs even deeper than just ju40. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild
learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the
Federal Government.”); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“ ‘Our Federalism’ . . . does
not mean blind deference to ‘States Rights’ any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers
rejected both these courses.”).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000). This “policy” traces, in slightly different language, to
the 1956 version of the Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 84-660, § 1(a), 70 Stat.
498, 498.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 83 (1931). Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority has, at least since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), been
split in concept between a broader power to regulate most things commercial and its more
specialized complement, a “Navigation Power,” where the latter is available only on waters
that are, were, or could be “navigable in fact.” See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557, 565 (1870). Of course, “navigable in fact” is itself a famous neologism. See Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., What Is a Navigable Water?: Canoes Count but Kayaks Do Not, 53 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1067 (2003) (tracing the development of navigability-in-fact doctrine and arguing that
it has grown so malleable as to be incoherent).
43. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193-221. Initially, this, too, was as much a question of
meaning as of federalism. Cf. id. at 193 (“The word used in the [C]onstitution, then, comprehends, and has been always understood to comprehend, navigation within its meaning;
and a power to regulate navigation, is as expressly granted, as if that term had been added
to the word ‘commerce.’ ”).
44. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (interpreting Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 broadly to vest in Corps great discretion over the building of
navigation infrastructure).
45. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717 (1950); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1 (1935).
46. By design, a dam may enable navigation between points A and B while precluding
it between AB and C. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 326-30
(1936); cf. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1967) (“The Commerce Clause
confers a unique position upon the Government in connection with navigable waters. ‘The
power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent
necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States.’ ”) (quoting Gilman v. City of
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724-25 (1865)).
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risdiction to prescribe. In fact, the phrase is perhaps a uniquely rich
artifact for historians of our federalism, also serving as a predicate
for federal court admiralty jurisdiction47 and as the (evolving) demarcation between federal and state public trust land and “servitude”
ownership.48 Against this backdrop, section 502(7) seems like an artless congressional dodge—especially given what is at stake in most of
the CWA’s domain.
In the five years following SWANCC, the circuits had split over
the geographic scope of section 502(7),49 the Executive had proposed
to amend its definition to curb section 502(7)’s scope and then
changed its mind,50 and property rights advocates had become convinced that the Executive agencies had run amok.51 Congress hardly
even considered acting. And instead of resolving any of this mess
with Rapanos and Carabell (as many lawyers had, since SWANCC,
hoped it would), the Court just continued to hoard all of the statute’s
biggest questions into its own inscrutable future.
Justice Scalia’s “plurality” opinion argues that in order to qualify
as “waters of the United States,” wetlands must have some permanent surface connection to “relatively permanent, standing or flowing
bodies of water” that are, if not necessarily “navigable” in any traditional sense, more than just “transitory puddles or ephemeral flows
of water.”52 In contrast to this emphasis on “permanence” and prox47. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563 (holding that the geographic limits
of admiralty jurisdiction under Article III are all those waters that are or might be “highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water”).
48. See Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913); United
States v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966).
49. FD & P Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 513-16 (D.N.J.
2003). The clear majority of cases to reach the circuit level affirmed the extension of jurisdiction over remote wetlands and headwaters of various types. See, e.g., Save Our Sonoran,
Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th
Cir. 2004); Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rueth
Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d
526 (9th Cir. 2001). For example, where the wetlands at issue were adjacent to and
drained into “a roadside ditch whose waters eventually flow into the navigable Wicomico
River and Chesapeake Bay,” the Fourth Circuit held that the extension of CWA jurisdiction was reasonable. See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 2003). One
case, however, did reject the extension of CWA jurisdiction to remote wetlands, see In re
Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003), and another rejected a strictly hydrological connection test where the connection was via ground water, see Rice v. Harken Exploration
Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001), setting up the circuit split the Court addressed in Rapanos and Carabell.
50. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (proposed Jan. 15, 2003).
51. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation et al. in Support of
Petitioners, Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (No. 04-1034).
52. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2220-21 (2006) (Scalia, J., joined by
Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, JJ.). The Scalia opinion is misleadingly denoted as the
plurality if, by that, it is meant as the authoritative statement of the judgment in the case.
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imity to navigable-in-fact waters, Justice Kennedy’s “concurrence”
argued that wetlands “possess the requisite nexus” if they “either
alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region[]
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ ”53 What
is so extraordinary about these opinions, though, is that Justice
Kennedy’s arguments had more in common with the dissent54 than
While both the Scalia and Kennedy opinions remand with instructions for further proceedings, the Scalia but not the Kennedy opinion directs that in those proceedings only the
finding of adjacency of petitioners’ wetlands to “ ‘waters’ in the ordinary sense of containing a relatively permanent flow” possessing “a continuous surface connection” will support
federal jurisdiction. Id. at 2235. Kennedy’s opinion leaves other possibilities open for supporting federal jurisdiction on the lands at issue in the two cases. See, e.g., id. at 2242
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressly rejecting that limitation on federal
authority over wetlands that otherwise possess a “significant nexus” to traditional “navigable waters”). But Justice Kennedy would also require proof of a “substantial nexus” in
waters and wetlands to which Justice Scalia’s opinion would extend the Act presumptively.
See id. at 2248.
In guidance issued in June 2007, the Corps and EPA jointly declared that they
will apply Rapanos to assert jurisdiction if the wetlands or tributaries meet either Justice
Kennedy’s or Justice Scalia’s standards. See Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the
U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States
(June 5, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/RapanosGuidance6507.pdf
(hereinafter Rapanos Guidance). But it is at best unclear how a statutory interpretation
case where there was no majority ought to append two separate definitions to a statute
that is administered by an agency. The Court has said that “[w]hen a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’ ” Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). And the Rapanos Guidance expressly invokes Marks.
See Rapanos Guidance, supra, at 3. But even putting aside concerns that Marks is unworkable in practice, Marks was a constitutional case, not the interpretation of a statute
administered by an agency. Where the (prospective) meaning of such a statute divides the
court evenly, it stands to reason—at least as well as Marks’s reasoning—that no authoritative precedent exists because combining disparate rationales to comprise a holding conflates the law of a case with the prospective aspect of precedent. Examples of this confusion
have already arisen. See, e.g., United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d 940 (W.D. Ky.
2007) (constructing the “controlling standard” for reading CWA section 502(7) from both
the Kennedy and Scalia opinions). In United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804
(7th Cir. 2005), a case that was vacated for further proceedings in light of Rapanos, Gerke
Excavating, Inc. v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2964, 2964 (2006), the Seventh Circuit invoked Marks to interpret Rapanos on remand before the Rapanos Guidance was issued.
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006). But the Seventh Circuit did so to combine Justice Kennedy’s test with that of the dissent as well as
that of the “plurality” alternatively, essentially triangulating Justice Kennedy’s opinion
into the opinion of the Court on the meaning of section 502(7). Id. at 724-25. The oddity of
investing such authority in the opinion of a single Justice has not been lost on all courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex.
2006) (refusing to find any opinion in Rapanos controlling).
53. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
54. The dissent argued that the extension of section 502(7) to intermittent tributaries
and most wetlands is, regardless of the agency interpretations on point, the best interpretation of the statute. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-66 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). As Justice Stevens made clear, this is the essence
of Parts I and II of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. See id. at 2264.
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with the so-called plurality, and the five Justices in the plurality
agreed on virtually no rationale for the result.
IV. MEANING AND REFERENCE: THE TRUTH ABOUT “WATERS OF THE
UNITED STATES”
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.55 and SWANCC
were both, in a sense, predictable. The CWA’s cryptic text was undoubtedly a congressional punt,56 although it remains unclear at
whom it was aimed: a judiciary increasingly mindful of state dignity
or the administrative agencies?57 It makes a fair amount of sense,
though, that wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters would be
covered and some waters inherently local in scale would not. After
all, if section 502(7) meant the agencies were empowered to regulate
the wholly intrastate, isolated, man-made ponds that were at issue in
northern Cook County,58 where would Executive power end? Having
recourse to some general theory in answering such basic questions
would surely be useful. Unfortunately, there seems to be no such
general theory—at least not one that appears very reliable. The
CWA’s language can be interpreted to produce very disparate results
just by way of the canons of statutory construction,59 even before academic jurisprudence and/or theories of language are involved.60 Legal
theory today is enmeshed in the philosophy of language, much as it
55. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
56. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1982).
57. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1070
(2006) (“One of the most basic decisions a legislator must make . . . is whether to delegate
to an administrative agency or to the courts.”). Stephenson’s model suggests that rational
legislators should prefer to delegate to agencies, although the CWA is silent as to the scope
of the agencies’ rulemaking powers and as to the scope of judicial review of agency rulemakings like the one implementing section 502(7).
58. Indeed, in United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit rejected the regulatory interpretation that would be at issue in SWANCC four years
later. In dicta, that court even said that
it is arguable that Congress has the power to regulate the discharge of pollutants into any waters that themselves flow across state lines, or connect to waters that do so, regardless of whether such waters are navigable in fact, merely
because of the interstate nature of such waters, although the existence of such
a far reaching power could be drawn into question by the Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence.
Id. at 256 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995); and others); see also Tabb Lakes Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726
(E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) (voicing doubts in dicta that the migratory bird nexus was sufficient for Corps jurisdiction). Another decision, Leslie Salt Co. v.
United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., Cargill v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 407 (1995), upheld the migratory bird “rule,” but by a very narrow margin of
deference.
59. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
60. See generally BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY (1993).
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has been for forty years, because its practitioners all acknowledge
law’s eternal flirtation with indeterminacy.61 Yet contemporary theories of language bring a measure of clarity to one thing about section
502(7): how much is open to debate.
Now, if there is one category of legal term whose meaning should
be relatively clear, it is so-called natural kind terms like ‘water’ or
‘species.’62 Several currents in the philosophy of language over the
last several decades suggest that using such terms is the equivalent
of rigidly designating whatever in the world is at the end of the utterance—whatever is its referent—as a matter of causal fact.63 “Waters” of the United States might just mean whatever in the world an
expert would find was a water body.64 The problem here is that where
land stops and water starts is so deeply unclear in so many different
contexts—as geomorphologists and ecologists have argued with increasing clarity and as the Rapanos Court was painfully aware.65 In
short, as a physical (and as a spatio-temporal) reference, “waters” is
actually pretty vague.66

61. Once the province of “legal realists,” the theory that legal argument is a cover for
naked preferences now belongs to social scientists employing the “attitudinal model.” See
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997).
62. See David O. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17
PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 105 (1988) (propounding a realist theory of legal interpretation
grounded in the semantics of “natural kind” terms). It is not clear that natural kinds help
legal interpretation very much as a general matter. See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND
TRUTH 51-53 (1996). I use them here for exemplary purposes only.
63. See, e.g., SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980); Hilary Putnam, The
Meaning of ‘Meaning,’ in MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS VOLUME
2, 215 (1975).
64. PUTNAM, supra note 63, at 241 (“[I]f there is a hidden structure, then generally it
determines what it is to be a member of the natural kind, not only in the actual world, but
in all possible worlds.”). Given the existence of experts, not all speakers of a concept need
know its exact extension. Cf. id. at 227 (“[T]here is a division of linguistic labor. We could
hardly use such words as ‘elm’ and ‘aluminum’ if no one possessed a way of recognizing elm
trees and aluminum metal; but not everyone to whom the distinction is important has to
be able to make the distinction.”). That would certainly square with basic principles of administrative law. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (deferring to
agency’s interpretation of statutory term “employee,” a term with several meanings at
common law, by reasoning that Congress intended agency expertise and national uniformity to be the result, not ad hoc judicial discretion).
65. See, e.g., RONALD U. COOKE & RICHARD W. REEVES, ARROYOS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH-WEST (1976). From arroyos to bayous,
to beach erosion and accretion, to floodplains, to ground/surface water interchanges, to
mangroves, to oxbows, to wetlands, the places where the boundary between land and water
is either constantly in flux or fundamentally vague are too numerous to pretend otherwise.
Cf. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2221 n.5 (2006) (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, J.) (admitting that line-drawing between “waters” and land
is inherently contingent on the purposes for which the lines are being drawn).
66. Cf. T.E. Wilkerson, Species, Essences and the Names of Natural Kinds, 43 PHIL. Q.
1, 7-10 (1993) (arguing that some natural kinds such as “species” turn out, on reflection, to
cover over enormous variabilities in nature, thus creating significant ambiguities in reference).
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Cases like this have paved the way for another, different theory of
language that is deeply skeptical of any “fact of the matter” where
meaning is concerned. This theory would fix the meaning of the concept “waters” by resorting to the conventions of speech observed by
competent speakers, in essence allowing usage to determine meaning
instead of reference.67 On this theory, “waters of the United States”
means just whatever lawyers, judges, and administrators have used
it to mean. But even now we have no way to settle what the concept
actually hooks up with: CWA practice itself has established how
many different credible usages of the concept there are.68 Even
within the Rapanos plurality there seemed to be significant variation
in what the Justices thought practice had brought to the term.69 And
all this is before we bring in the messy social institutions invoked by
the expression: some theory of our federalism, after all, must settle
what “of the United States” truly means.70 To parse apart the possible congressional intentions within that set of issues is to broaden
the inquiry perhaps indefinitely.
Thus, it cannot be doubted that section 502(7) is an exemplar of
what legal theorists see as law’s areas of “open texture.”71 The gener67. See, e.g., Michael Dummett, Realism, in TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS 145, 146
(1978). Perhaps the fairest ascription of this “antirealist” view would be, ironically, to certain American “legal realists” like Llewellyn. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 139
(2d ed. 1994).
68. Compare Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001)
(local irrigation district’s canals held to be “waters of the United States”), with United
States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984) (wetlands created by man-made
manipulations of adjacent river not “waters of the United States”); compare United States
v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (split panel unable to agree what constitutes “adjacency” sufficient to put wetlands within “waters of the United States”), with United States v.
Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1993) (wetlands above headwaters that were adjacent to tributaries susceptible to use in interstate commerce held to be “waters of the United States”).
69. Justice Scalia’s opinion argued that it is “beyond parody” that section 502(7) had
been extended to storm sewers, drainage ditches, and “[dry] arroyos in the middle of the
desert.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito,
JJ.). He further noted that “[t]hese judicial constructions . . . are not outliers. Rather, they
reflect the breadth of the Corps’ determinations in the field.” Id. at 2218. This was in keeping with his conclusion that the only wetlands and tributarties properly subject to federal
jurisdiction were those “with a continuous surface connection” to “permanent” water
courses, such “that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and ‘wetlands.’ ” Id. at
2226-27. In his own opinion, though, the Chief Justice argued that this state of the law
cried out for more agency attention and especially the creation of better, clearer definitions. Id. at 2235-36, (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Kennedy’s opinion takes pointed
and specific issue with Justice Scalia’s disbelief that “waters” could include arroyos. Id. at
2242-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). That is an argument Justice Kennedy
seems to have the better of. See COOKE & REEVES, supra note 65.
70. Cf. Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.
1994) (Easterbrook, J.) (“[T]he Clean Water Act does not attempt to assert national power
to the fullest. ‘Waters of the United States’ must be a subset of ‘water’; otherwise why insert the qualifying clause in the statute? (No one suggests that the function of this phrase
is to distinguish domestic waters from those of Canada or Mexico.)”).
71. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 606-15 (1958).
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ality of the term is at once the source of its power and its mischief for
any theory of law—at least any theory of law meaning to account for
law’s normativity. Where most modern positivists would view the
term as a source of discretion because the law is ambiguous (and
perhaps deliberately so),72 Dworkin, Rawls, and various moral “realists” view it as an implied duty to make the law more just through
instantiations and a gradual judicial synthesis of meaning.73 American legal theory orbits this philosophical divide like a planet to a sun
even though it has given off more heat than light for years now.74
Putting aside some nuances and intermediate positions between
the two, the dispute comes down to the scope and legitimacy of the
judicial role. Where positivists since H.L.A. Hart have viewed judges
as constrained professionals doing the hard (often scut) work of applying preexisting norms to present particulars, Dworkin views the
judiciary as the agency of justice, always working to earn law’s authority on its behalf.75 Dworkin has long argued that justice requires
that adjudicators no less than other officials find the one best interpretation of the law—what the law really requires. Yet where Dworkin and
others expect that (legal) truth might “exceed its demonstrability”76 and
thereby require a thick, constitutive function in application, modern
positivism responds that texts like section 502(7) have no more than a
core of settled meaning, surrounded by a (potentially vast) “penumbra”
of plausible interpretations.77 Thus, the dispute—what to do about legal
72. See id.
73. See Ronald Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624 (1963); John Rawls, Two
Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955); cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 245 (1986)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE] (“Law as integrity . . . requires a judge to test his interpretation of any part of the great network of political structures and decisions of his
community by asking whether it could form part of a coherent theory justifying the network as a whole.”) (emphasis added). I use “realist” to describe Dworkin, Rawls, and others
in the epistemological sense, distinguishing them from the “antirealists” who maintain
that meaning and truth are entirely a function of (fallible) human conventions.
74. Cf. BIX, supra note 60, at 182 (“The dependence of legal determinacy questions on
matters that seem to be simply language-based but are not, is due to the nature of normative discourse. . . . [I]n the context of a moral or legal imperative, it is important to know
the limits of a term’s application, because it is important to know whether an action is included or excluded from a prohibition or authorization.”). This is what differentiates ordinary language and its tolerable flimsiness from legal language and the necessities that it
function according to plan.
75. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 183-86 (2006) (arguing that legality and
the content of law must turn not just on “social facts” or a law’s sources and pedigree but
also on its moral content).
76. STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 6 (1991).
77. HART, supra note 67, at 141-47; Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT
TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 98, 123-25 & n.40 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001); Brian Leiter, Legal
Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT:
ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 355 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001). Hart
himself always believed that the areas of “open texture” were relatively few and that, as an
empirical matter, judicial discretion was quite interstitial. HART, supra note 67, at 154,
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indeterminacy and its resultant discretion—can keep going right into
the heart of law’s practical normativity.78
Yet, while both had a picture of meaning at the base of their theory of law, neither convinced the practitioners of law or legal theory
of their picture’s fidelity, either to how law is practiced or to what
law should be. Hart thought he had found a third path between the
naïve formalism of the ancients and the radical indeterminism of
Holmes and his successors. Dworkin successfully obfuscated the path
Hart had lit by arguing that it went nowhere, that it was a theory of
law without its most central element: its obligations to justice. What
the American legal academy has been left with are two theories of
law that differ in many of the same ways semantic realism differs
from antirealism. In their bare form, each is subject to devastating
critique based on practitioners’ tacit knowledge of their ordinary
practices. But once they are fully reticulated, with artful qualifications in sophisticated expositive accounts, each is quite plausible—
even elegant.
Of course, if both of these theories fail to authoritatively fix the
legal meaning of a term like “waters of the United States,” a fair
question might be: Why bother with them at all? Why care about legal theory if it is so contingent and slack at exactly the junctures
lawyers go in search of such tools? The answer is because we desperately need some means of differentiating legitimate from illegitimate
applications of the statute. We need to know whether propositions of
law using the concept to define federal jurisdiction are true79 (or

274. He gave no support for this, though, and some later positivists shy from the same
claim. See, e.g., BIX, supra note 60, at 36-62; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:
A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
191-96 (1991).
78. Positivism conceives of a norm’s (intersubjective) preexistence as integral to the
judge’s authority to apply it, indeed, to the judiciary’s claim to authoritative decisionmaking. See HART, supra note 67, at 100-17. But, to be clear, I am not implying that Hart was
one of those who viewed discretion as a bad thing, necessarily. Hart actually maintained
that the law’s use of general terms having an open texture could be an advantage, a way of
enabling judges to make reasonable decisions. Id. at 125-26. Dworkin, in contrast, maintains that law’s normativity depends on the overall justification in its applications as much
as its fit with past practice. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 73, at 285 (“A successful
interpretation must not only fit but also justify the practice it interprets.”). And that is not
to say Dworkin thinks fit unimportant. See DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 183 (“Legality is
sensitive in its application . . . to the history and standing practices of the community that
aims to respect the value, because a political community displays legality, among other requirements, by keeping faith in certain ways with its past.”).
79. Knowing that “x is true” is the same as knowing under what conditions stating
that “x is true” is correct. G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, LANGUAGE, SENSE AND NONSENSE:
A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION INTO MODERN THEORIES OF LANGUAGE 257-58 (1984). Knowledge of these truth conditions might take any of several forms, though. Cf. PATTERSON, supra note 62, at 18 (arguing that both people who believe reference determines meaning
(“realists”) and people who believe usage determines meaning (“antirealists”) “believe that
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“sound” or some such other hedge from the strong claim of truth)—
not just whether judges of one ideology or political party are likely to
hold to the propositions.80
It was clear before SWANCC and Rapanos that section 502(7) and
the CWA’s extension to “isolated” waters, ditches, and intermittent
tributaries involved issues running much, much deeper than just a
statutory definition.81 Indeed, if anything, SWANCC just intensified
the federal judiciary’s vigilance toward the statute’s tensions with recent federalism precedents.82 And, on first inspection, Dworkin’s theory of judging gathers some confirmation from the 99+ pages of slip
opinion in Rapanos. But that impression is misleading in a way that
tells us something not just about the state of legal theory today, but
also about the practice of law before one of the nation’s courts that
has so obviously internalized Dworkin’s philosophy. For, while this
Court has Hercules’ hubris, it has none of his discipline and evidently cares little about law’s “integrity.”83

the truth of propositions of law is a matter of truth conditions” that are independent of the
speaker/proposition itself).
80. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 94-104 (arguing that the degree to which the
Justices in Bush v. Gore allowed their personal politics to influence their judgment should
be regretted by all lawyers), with Cross, supra note 61, at 265 (“Among many political scientists, aspects of the attitudinal model [assuming that judicial decisionmaking is not
based upon reasoned judgment about what law requires but rather upon each judge’s political ideology and the identity of the parties] have become a virtual truism.”).
81. In fact, that much was evident long before SWANCC. In Avoyelles Sportsmen’s
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983), a citizen suit was brought to enjoin the
clearing of a 20,000-acre parcel of land in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana, lying within the
Bayou Natchitoches basin—land that was seasonally flooded and mostly forested wetlands
“adjacent” to navigable rivers. Id. at 901-02. EPA and the Corps were defendants because
the plaintiffs argued the parcel was within the scope of the CWA and, thus, that the Corps
and EPA were under a duty to assert jurisdiction. Id. While the district court took the extraordinary step of making the wetlands findings itself in a trial de novo pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(F), the court of appeals reversed, arguing that that was “the kind of scientific decision normally accorded significant deference by the courts.” Id. at 905-06. But the
court of appeals was troubled by the agencies’ quick change of methodology for wetlands
determinations to include vegetation adapted to intermittent inundation and saturation as
well as that adapted to more regular/constant inundation. Id. at 907-08 & n.18. Ultimately,
the court held that the change was legal and not procedurally invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act, id. at 910-14, but it did so quite aware of the ramifications for the
CWA’s geographic scope. Id. at 914-18.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 705-08 (4th Cir. 2003).
83. Dworkin’s concept of integrity in law is, for him, what unites legality with justice.
See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 73, at 225 (“According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and
procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.”).
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V. RESTORING NATURE’S INTEGRITY: THE OBJECTIVE AND THE
REAL(ITY)
It is, of course, impossible to restore the “chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”84 without reinventing
American civilization as we know it.85 It has been said that the agencies more or less accidentally ignored this mandate’s biological and
physical prongs, but that is not quite true. Shortly after the Act’s
passage, EPA held a national symposium on CWA section 101(a) “integrity” and what its restoration would entail.86 It was a national
meeting of minds, but it failed to settle very much about the mission.87 All the same, the agencies issued rules defining “waters of the
United States” in 1975, 1977, and again in 1986,88 eventually deciding to broaden their definitions to include most tributaries, headwaters, wetlands, and other attenuated elements of a lotic system.89
This Part explains how two relatively conservative administrative
agencies gradually decided, in six different Presidential administrations, to expand federal jurisdiction as dramatically as they have.
A. Restoration as an Ecological Practice
Remote and isolated wetlands and tributaries, notwithstanding
their legal attenuation from the traditional concerns of the federal
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
85. See, e.g., In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618, 624 (8th Cir.
2005) (“In its natural state, the river subjected the surrounding basin to extensive flooding
every spring.”). “Chemical” integrity has dominated agency and public attention to the exclusion of the other two. See generally Adler, supra note 19. And while eliminating the discharge of chemical pollutants in all of the nation’s waters is work enough for many times
the staff EPA has devoted to water programs, ADLER ET AL., supra note 31, at 227-57,
“[t]here is considerable and more consistent evidence that the ‘physical and biological integrity’ of the nation’s waters has been steadily and seriously declining.” Adler, supra note
19, at 50.
86. See James R. Karr, Biological Integrity: A Long-Neglected Aspect of Water Resource Management, 1 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 66, 69 (1991).
87. Id.
88. See Corps of Engineers, Notice of Interim Final Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975);
Corps of Engineers, Notice of Final Rulemaking, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (1977); Corps of Engineers, Notice of Final Rulemaking, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (1986).
89. In the 1975 interim final rule (which would become the basis of the 1977 rulemaking), the Corps’ basic definition swept in all waters used in the past, present, or possibly in
the future “as a means to transport interstate commerce landward to their ordinary high
water mark and up to the head of navigation,” including all artificial channels, canals, and
the like, all “tributaries . . . up to their headwaters and landward to their ordinary high
water mark,” wetlands “contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters,” and “other waters” including “intermittent rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that are
not contiguous or adjacent to navigable waters” whose regulation was deemed necessary
“for the protection of water quality.” 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 at 31,324-325. While the Corps
defined “headwaters” (arbitrarily) as “the point on the stream above which the flow is normally less than 5 cubic feet per second,” id. at 31325, it did seek to preserve field office discretion to include headwaters in appropriate cases. Id. No general definition of “tributary”
was even attempted, though.
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government, are the parts of the nation’s lotic systems perhaps most
in need of regulatory protection today. “Isolated” wetlands, after all,
are identified more by their legal aspects than by their physical or
biological aspects.90 For thirty years the agencies have struggled to
draw lines around the parts of aquatic ecosystems they should govern.91 NatureServe, a national network of natural heritage programs
and environmental consultants that services many state and local
governments, recently documented the roles “isolated wetlands” play.
It confirmed their critical importance to the protection and restoration of aquatic habitat, water quality, and biotic integrity.92 Indeed,
what the agencies’ experiences document is that restoring the natural integrity of the nation’s waters is utterly impossible without
something like the most energetic and integrative public response in
the history of the administrative state.93 Clearest of all, though, is
that the biota of the nation’s waters is in decline: North America’s
most imperiled species are almost all aquatic species.94
While the Corps and EPA initially tried to focus only on the principal surface waters and their immediate threats, this strategy
quickly became untenable.95 Soon enough, the agencies learned that
90. See R.W. TINER ET AL., GEOGRAPHICALLY ISOLATED WETLANDS: A PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT OF THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND STATUS IN SELECTED AREAS OF THE UNITED
STATES 2-1 (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 2003) (questioning the scientific validity of distinguishing “isolated” wetlands). As Justice Kennedy understood, establishing hydrological or
biological connections between remote wetlands and navigable waters is easy; differentiating those with significant, proximate connections is hard. See Rapanos v. United States,
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2248-50 (2006). The little rigorous taxonomic work that has been done on
stream magnitude—the most intuitive method for doing so—is still more art than science.
See Robert A. Kuehne, A Classification of Streams, Illustrated by Fish Distribution in an
Eastern Kentucky Creek, 43 ECOLOGY 608 (1962); cf. MEYER ET AL., supra note 24, at 6 (differentiating perennial, intermittent, and ephemeral streams).
91. Cf. 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,129 (“[S]treams with highly irregular flows, such as occur in
the western portion of the country, could be dry at the ‘headwater’ point for more of the
year and still average on a yearly basis a flow of five cubic feet per second because of high
volume, flash flood type flows which greatly distort the average.”). By 1977, the Corps was
making clear that its exclusion of “headwaters” from regulated tributaries was not to fence
them out of section 502(7)’s scope necessarily, but rather to manage personnel resources
and to say where Corps permitting authority ended as a presumption. See id. Not surprisingly, the rulemaking was taken up into congressional debates as reason to clarify section
502(7), although the 1977 amendments ultimately made no such change. See Avoyelles
Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 914-16 (5th Cir. 1983). This would later
become one of the majority’s arguments supporting section 502(7)’s extension to adjacent
wetlands in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135-39 (1985).
92. See P. COMER ET AL., BIODIVERSITY VALUES OF GEOGRAPHICALLY ISOLATED
WETLANDS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
(2005),
available
at
http://www.natureserve.org/library/isolated_wetlands_05/isolated_wetlands.pdf.
93. See, e.g., Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and
Resource Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 62,566 (2000); Andreen, supra note 17, at 591-93.
94. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 31, at 61-85; DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDOR’S
SHADOW: THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF WILDLIFE IN AMERICA 105-37 (1999).
95. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 31, at 94-96, 212-14. Following Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975), the regulatory definition
of “navigable waters of the United States” came under searching judicial scrutiny several
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they could restore the natural integrity of a “water” only with a
whole watershed approach, an inclusive method meant to identify
and neutralize the variety of disturbances to aquatic ecology.96
Though at least six Justices between SWANCC and Rapanos have
viewed this as mission creep97—as agencies run amok—it is actually
far more mundane: the agencies are adapting institutionally to
achieve the CWA’s integrity objective in our legal system. Here too,
though, questions of meaning still dominate the legal analysis, and it
is the courts that are threatening to undo ongoing, directly deliberative regulatory work by way of an empty, yet paradoxically prescriptive, legal semantics.

times. See, e.g., United States v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1981) (privately owned
canal); United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979) (wetlands adjacent to intrastate lake); United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979) (intrastate
stream never used for commercial navigation, terminating in two intrastate reservoirs);
Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978) (calculation of mean high water
mark on salt marshes in San Francisco Bay). In only one of the cases I was able to find did a
court reject the Corps’ interpretation of its jurisdiction. See United States v. City of Fort Pierre,
747 F.2d 464, 466-67 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding there was no jurisdiction over a man-made slough
with a hydrological connection to navigable waters that was caused by Corps activities).
96. Much has been done to publicize the shift to a watershed approach. See OFFICE OF
WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A REVIEW OF STATEWIDE WATERSHED MANAGEMENT
APPROACHES (2002). Of course, its overall effectiveness and compatibility with existing federal law are still very much open questions. See James R. May, The Rise and Repose of Assimilation-Based Water Quality, Part I: TMDL Litigation, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10247 (2004).
97. Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito all voted against the assertion of jurisdiction in SWANCC or Rapanos or both. Justice
Kennedy, however, seems to have become attached to the “significant nexus” test in
SWANCC, even where it may support broad federal jurisdiction. Of course, quite notoriously, the 1986 changes to the regulatory definition, done on the heels of the Riverside
Bayview opinion, professed an intent only to “provide[] clarification” and not to broaden the
agencies’ interpretation of section 502(7)’s geographic scope. See Final Rule for Regulatory
Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,216-17 (Nov. 13, 1986). This
same preamble discussion, though, was where the agencies first gave general notice that
they interpreted the term to extend to waters that “would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties” and “[w]hich are or would be used as habitat for endangered species.” Id. at 41,217. And the Rapanos Guidance seems to capitalize in a similar
way, this time stating that agency staff should heed “Justice Kennedy’s instruction” to
“apply the significant nexus standard in a manner that restores and maintains [the chemical, physical, and biological integrity] of traditional navigable waters.” Rapanos Guidance,
supra note 52, at 9 n.32.
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B. “What Is a Tributary?”98: Judicial Hubris and the Irrelevance of
Agency Learning
Once the Court found that wetlands “adjacent” to navigable waters and their tributaries are within the scope of section 502(7)99—
and then found that “isolated” waters are outside it100—the distinguishing features of a real “tributary” became the central issue.101
The agencies have never defined a tributary by rule, and for good
reason: every general definition formulated as such runs square into
either (1) the diversity of hydrographic features in North America or
(2) the enormity of the restorative project, biologically. A regulatory
definition of tributary “clarifying” the scope of section 502(7), in
short, would bring troubles both of political morality and of practicability. Yet five Justices—Justices Kennedy and Scalia and those joining Justice Scalia’s opinion—seemed convinced that the agencies’ refusal to dive into this breach was some kind of failure on their part.102
Whose is the bigger failure, though? So-called engineered transfers103 are shaping up to be one of the major “integrity” issues to98. Linda Greenhouse, In the Roberts Court, There’s More Room for Argument, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2006, at A1 (attributing this question to Chief Justice Roberts in the Rapanos and Carabell oral argument). Interestingly, the agencies now maintain that a tributary “includes natural, man-altered, or man-made water bodies that carry flow directly or
indirectly into a traditional navigable water.” Rapanos Guidance, supra note 52, at 5 n.21.
They even specify—in guidance only—that “a tributary . . . is the entire reach of the
stream that is of the same order (i.e., from the point of confluence, where two lower order
streams meet to form the tributary, downstream to the point such tributary enters a
higher order stream).” Id. In a nod to the Chief Justice, see supra note 69, the Rapanos
Guidance at least includes the dictum that the “agencies intend to more broadly consider
jurisdictional issues, including clarification and definition of key terminology, through
rulemaking or other appropriate policy process.” Id. at 3.
99. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1985).
100. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 171-72 (2001). The Court took care in 1985 to note that the provisions of the regulatory definition covering nonadjacent wetlands were not at issue. Riverside Bayview, 474
U.S. at 124 n.2. The Court also took care to reference what the subject wetlands were adjacent to: a “navigable waterway.” See id. at 131 n.8 (assuming adjacency is to “bodies of
open water”).
101. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2217-19 (2006). Courts have put
tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters within section 502(7)’s scope since the early 1970s,
even prior to the agencies’ first rulemakings. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil &
Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665
(M.D. Fla. 1974).
102. Compare Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220-24 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and
Alito, Thomas, J.) (arguing that “the waters” with its “definite article” has a “natural definition” that can be taken from a 1954 dictionary that includes only “relatively permanent,
standing or flowing bodies of water”), with id. at 2251-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (finding that “[t]he Corps’ existing standard for tributaries,” any landform with
a mean high water mark, provides no assurance that the CWA’s geographic scope will be
appropriately limited).
103. See Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Nebraska,
North Dakota, and Utah Urging Reversal in Support of the City of New York at 2-3 & n.1,
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York (Catskills II), 451
F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2006) (Nos. 03-7203(L), 03-7253 (XAP) [hereinafter Western States Brief,
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day.104 Are they “tributaries” or “point sources”? The statutory definition of “point source” includes “any discernable, confined and discrete
conveyance” including ditches and channels105—and that means that
some engineered transfers could conceivably be either. Lame, indeterminate analogies are easy here. The harder, more meaningful
question goes directly to the statute’s highest plateau: at what does
the integrity objective aim, exactly? Are the agencies truly obligated
to “restore” the physical integrity of, for example, the Connecticut
River? Including its tributaries, the Connecticut River boasts over
one thousand dams (a few of which are centuries old) and has, for
almost a century, gone without tributary flow that now goes to Boston’s reservoirs.106 If EPA and the Corps have no restorative obligations under the CWA growing out of that history, on what (implicit)
grounds can that be shown? That it would be uneconomic?
These are not only the biggest moral questions with which a statute like the CWA confronts us, they are also its purest questions of
statutory interpretation. They are questions our “minimalist” Supreme Court has, counting Rapanos and Carabell, ducked at least
eleven times now107 and which Congress and the agencies have been
ducking since 1972. In an important sense, there is no “natural kind”
differentiating real tributaries from other tributaries of “navigable

Catskills II] (“Since most precipitation in the West falls as snow . . . it is necessary to divert and deliver water through a complex system of manmade and natural conveyances
and reservoirs. This allows the West to sustain its cities, farms, and ranches.”).
104. See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364
(11th Cir. 2002), rev’d in part, S. Fl. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541
U.S. 95 (2004); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York
(Catskills I), 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, remanded in part, Catskills II, 244
F. Supp. 2d 41 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir.
1996).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).
106. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); cf. Western States Brief,
Catskills II, supra note 103, at 6 (“[T]he ability to divert, transport, store, and use water is
critical to the social and economic well-being of the West. Moving water from one basin to
another through engineered transfers is essential to meet municipal, industrial, and agricultural demands.”).
107. “Minimalism,” a philosophy of deciding things on the narrowest and shallowest
grounds possible, is usually packaged as a model of judicial restraint (not one of incoherence). See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999). The Supreme Court’s avoidance of the CWA’s “integrity” ideal
strains that packaging at the very least. See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Dep’t of Evntl.
Prot., 126 S. Ct. 1843, 1852-53 (2006); Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. at 102-12; Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 175-97 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of cert.); PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 707-22
(1994); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 102-14 (1992); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 311-20 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers
Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1981) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Costle v. Pac. Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 200-04 (1980).
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waters.”108 Too many of our aquatic ecosystems have become what
they are today because of profound derangements of their watershed.109 And many tributaries are ecologically integral without being
permanent, significant, or particularly natural.110 Thus, unsurprisingly, the agencies have waffled on general propositions.111
In 1975, EPA’s General Counsel found that, on the best interpretation of the statute and its legislative history, massive irrigation
projects and engineered transfers could, under the right circumstances, be point sources.112 Thirty years later, in taking a “holistic
approach” to the statute, EPA quite incredibly concluded the exact
opposite.113 According to EPA now, engineered transfers are never
108. Even in a realist semantics where there is supposed to be “a causal-historical path
of the appropriate sort connecting our use of the term, via various intermediaries, with the
[thing] itself,” Brink, supra note 62, at 117, science has thus far failed to reveal that path
for lotic systems as wholes, leaving essentially no truth conditions for any claim of a controversial sort here. Cf. COOKE & REEVES, supra note 65, at 187-89 (concluding the evidence supports a causal correlation between human land use changes and arroyo formation, but leaving to the “area of speculation” which land use changes are responsible). In a
pragmatic sense, of course, there are manageably coherent concepts of “natural” as distinct
from “artificial” waters. The reflecting pool on the Capitol Mall is intuitively different from
the Tidal Basin beside the Jefferson Memorial even if both are “artificial” in some sense.
But to assume this intuition can be formulated into a general principle distinguishing
which human-influenced waters are still ecologically integral and/or significant is to assume away too many of ecology’s realities today.
109. WILCOVE, supra note 94, at 116-20. This fact alone has sobered the agencies in
their pursuit of the integrity mandate. See Mank, supra note 8, at 886-89; cf. Memorandum
from Ann R. Klee, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional Administrators,
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Agency Interpretation on Applicability of Section 402 of the
Clean Water Act to Water Transfers, 3-4 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Klee Memorandum]
(“Many large cities in the west and the east would not have adequate sources of water for
their citizens were it not for the continuous redirection of water from outside basins.”).
110. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 24, at 16-21; COOKE & REEVES, supra note 65, at 515. There is, however, good reason to believe that the ordinary concept of a “tributary”
masks a great deal of natural variability that, if better described and understood, might
dissolve at least some of the issues now surrounding section 502(7). See id. at 6-7.
111. See, e.g., Klee Memorandum, supra note 109, at 2-3 & n.5 (acknowledging agency
inconsistency).
112. See In re Riverside Irrigation Dist., Ltd. and 17 Others, Decision of the General
Counsel No. 21 (June 27, 1975) [hereinafter Riverside Opinion]. Point sources are prohibited from discharging without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000). Shortly after the Riverside Opinion, a district court held that EPA lacked authority to exempt such discharges
from the regulatory definition of point source. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train,
396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975). Shortly after that the 1977 amendments changed section
502 to exclude “agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). Questions often arise, though, over the scope and meaning
of that exclusion. See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34
F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994).
113. See Klee Memorandum, supra note 109, at 5. Oddly, in its “holistic approach” the
Klee Memorandum misstates that “[t]he purpose of the CWA is to protect water quality.”
Id. The memo was directed at regional personnel, ordering them to resist several circuit
court precedents holding that engineered transfers could be point sources. Id. at 2-3. The
agency eventually began an informal rulemaking process to formalize its interpretation of “point
source.” See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887 (June 7, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
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point sources and ought not be regulated by the CWA at all.114 Yet,
given the statute’s integrity objective, this just sets up the dilemma
of whether some actual canal, ditch, slough, channel, or the like conveying water is, instead, a tributary within the meaning of section
502(7) and its regulations.115
Before Rapanos and SWANCC, courts usually—in deference to
the agencies—did not distinguish between natural and artificial waters, wetlands, and tributaries.116 Of course, neither agency has ever
explained or given general reasons for its approach. The agencies had
found, it seems, that generalizations about tributaries were premature.117 And forbearance of this kind is well known in administrative
114. See Klee Memorandum, supra note 109, at 5 (“The [CWA] expresses the understanding that, as a general matter, water control facilities that merely transport ‘the waters of the United States’ to where they can be most beneficially used are not subject to the
NPDES regime.”); cf. Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887, 32,890 (“Water transfers are an
essential component of the nation’s infrastructure for delivering water that users are entitled to receive under State law.”).
115. But cf. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223 n.7 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, J.) (“It is also true that highly artificial, manufactured, enclosed conveyance systems . . . likely do not qualify as ‘waters of the United
States,’ despite the fact that they may contain continuous flows of water.”). If that is true,
it is unclear how. See, e.g., P.F.Z. Props., Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975)
(wetlands adjacent to canals not used in navigation for many years held to be within the
scope of section 502(7)). Neither EPA nor the Corps has ever taken the position that the inclusion of “tributaries” within 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 and 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 implicitly or otherwise excluded artificial tributaries such as canals, ditches, swales, and so on. See United
States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (dredge and fill case involving wetlands adjacent to man-made
drainage ditch that had been, at one time, subject to the ebb and flow of the tide).
116. Compare In re Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 632 (1884) (federal navigation power extends
to man-made canals), with Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 169 n.3 (1979)
(privately owned artificial inlet hydrologically connected to Pacific Ocean is itself navigable
waters within the meaning of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899). Wetlands cases involving artificial influences and/or connections include Tull, 769 F.2d at 184-85; United States
v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d
597 (3d Cir. 1974). One decison, United States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464, 467 (8th
Cir. 1984), without explaining why, held that wetlands conditions created by the Corps’
own navigation projects in an adjacent river could not support the extension of federal jurisdiction. Two Seventh Circuit cases also observed that there were limits to the geographic scope of section 502(7). See Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24
F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999 F.2d 256
(7th Cir. 1993).
117. The agencies have maintained that anything with an “ordinary high water mark”
may be a tributary. Cf. 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c) (2006) (“In the absence of adjacent wetlands,
the jurisdiction extends to the ordinary high water mark . . . .”); 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (“[I]n the absence of wetlands the upstream limit of Corps jurisdiction also stops
when the ordinary high water mark is no longer perceptible.”). Yet, given the lack of an interval in their definition of an ordinary high water mark, see 33 C.F.R. at § 328.3(e) (2006),
this is less of a general definition than a delegation of discretion to the field officer—
exactly what a rational agency should do if it lacks a preference on a general definition. Cf.
SCHAUER, supra note 77, at 43 (“To the extent that generalizations become entrenched, the
inclusions of past generalizations facilitate dealing with the future when it is like the past,
but the suppressions of past generalizations impede dealing with the future when that future departs from our prior expectations.”).
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law. In fact, it has long been an adjunct of judicial respect for agency
expertise:
Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a
statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development,
while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable
situations. In performing its important functions in these respects,
therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either
by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.118

Yet at least four Justices—two of whom had yet to serve even a
full Term—thought that hubris explained the wetlands programs
better than a deft touch taken to an especially hard problem of restoration ecology. Nonetheless, confronting the tradeoffs raised by the
integrity ideal on a case-by-case basis cannot be the Executive run
amok, insulting the dignity of states. If anything, EPA and the Corps
have avoided the very kind of narcissistic self-certainty of which the
Rapanos plurality had too much.119 For better or worse, the agencies
have sought to preserve the geographic scope of section 502(7)—often
just leaving a vacuum where they had implied they would serve as a
regulatory check120—for the simple reason that, in our legal culture,
it seems the only possible path to the statute’s ends: the restoration
of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters. Still, Part VI suggests that this has been their biggest mistake.
VI. INTERPRETING ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY: LAW’S INTEGRITY
AND NATURE’S
Given its ubiquity and ambiguity in regulatory practice today,
Chevron was surely the “known unknown” in the Rapanos litiga-

118. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
119. Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s confidence in his dictionary (at least one edition
of his dictionary, see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 & n.3
(1994)), H.L. Mencken was probably right when he said that for every complex problem
there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong. Whatever the possibilities for a semantics of “waters” or, derivatively, of “tributary,”
one of the most frequent justifications courts give for choosing a particular construction is that the alternative interpretation would produce “absurd” results,
or results less compatible with the reason or purpose of the statute. This, it
seems to me, unquestionably involves judicial consideration and evaluation of
competing policies, and for precisely the same purpose for which . . . agencies
consider and evaluate them—to determine which one will best effectuate the
statutory purposes.
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 515.
120. See Adler, supra note 27, at 66-70; see also William E. Taylor & Kate L. Geoffroy,
General and Nationwide Permits, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING
SECTION 404, 151 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005).
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tion.121 Chevron’s tenure at the Supreme Court has been tumultuous,
a function of its own internally conflicted justification.122 Today, despite its importance, it is a mangled wreckage of barely reconcilable
precedents,123 at least in part because the Chevron opinion could not
possibly have meant what it seemed to say.124 In Dworkin’s terms, it
seemed to picture the judicial role as one where courts ensure that
an agency’s statutory interpretation “fits” but not necessarily that it
be justified.125 And that seemed like a rather denatured role for
courts in our system. Empirical analysis to date largely confirms that
the lower courts have afforded greater deference to agency interpretations more often when they apply Chevron.126 Given our judicial hi121. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. In Rapanos, both the dissents and Justice Kennedy pointedly mention Chevron’s role in Riverside Bayview. See Rapanos v.
United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2240 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
at 2252-53, 2259 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Interestingly, though, Justice Kennedy does not rely on Chevron in his own opinion in Rapanos in
any way.
122. Chevron articulates at least three distinct reasons for the judiciary to defer to administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes, including congressional intent, the relative expertise of agencies compared to courts, and the relative political accountability of
agencies compared to courts. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-65 (1984). The last of these, political accountability, broke from prior
precedent and is, in many ways, inconsistent with the other two. See Thomas A. Merrill,
The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
STORIES 399, 413-14 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (describing Paul Bator’s role as the first
“political” Solicitor General and his argument in Chevron that the reason courts ought to
defer to agency interpretations of law is because the President supervises agencies and
they are, therefore, politically accountable).
123. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440
(2003); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S.
106, 114 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366 (1999); Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, Local 1309 v. Dep’t of the Interior, 526
U.S. 86 (1999); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988); NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. 112 (1987); INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987).
124. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 969-70 (1992) (“[R]ead for all it is worth, [Chevron] would make administrative actors
the primary interpreters of federal statutes and relegate courts to the largely inert role of
enforcing unambiguous statutory terms.”); see Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron:
An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 44-47 (1998) (noting how drastically Chevron seems to truncate the judiciary’s traditional role in reviewing agency interpretations of law).
125. Compare DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 73, at 285 (“A successful interpretation must not only fit but also justify the practice it interprets.”), with Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842-43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. . . .
[However], if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.”).
126. See Aaron P. Avila, Application of the Chevron Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 8
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 398, 429 (2000); Kerr, supra note 124; Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
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erarchy, it is probably unremarkable that lower courts “seem to take
Chevron more seriously than does the Supreme Court.”127 But Rapanos well demonstrates how the Supreme Court itself applies Chevron in deep statutory conflicts like the ones provoked by section
502(7): capriciously.128 In fact, it is shocking how little force the case
seems to exert on the one bench so obviously positioned to make big
mistakes often.
In the famous Hart/Dworkin debate about how often law’s “open
texture” confers a kind of generative discretion on interpreters,129
Chevron’s most recent appearances at the Court are chilling. The
empirical evidence may not explicitly confirm the attitudinal hypothesis,130 but neither does it refute one. Indeed, Hart’s faith in an
interstitial picture of discretion bounded by precedent lacks credibility if the Chevron doctrine is the focus. Yet if there is some true
meaning to Chevron, some best way it hangs together with the rest of
administrative law the Justices are trying to find, it is so far lost on
the rest of us. At the very least the Justices have shown that the authority of administrative agencies is, for them, an “interpretive concept.”131 And that should be reason enough to demand more from the
Court than Rapanos yielded, both as to Chevron and as to its interpretation of the CWA. For all their supposed hubris, the agencies had
gone out of their way to respect state sovereignty and to balance sections 101(a) and 101(b) of the CWA—as any practitioner of water law
knows. Indeed, if there is a move in this story demanding better justification from the agencies, it is EPA’s “reinterpretation” of engineered transfers now underway.132 How it squares with the CWA’s
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990
DUKE L.J. 984, 1058-59. Merrill argued to the contrary. See Merrill, supra note 124, at 98085.
127. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 387 (4th ed.
2004)
128. See, e.g., Note, “How Clear Is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1687 (2005) (it depends).
129. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
130. The attitudinal hypothesis is that Supreme Court Justices seek to effectuate their
own favored policy outcomes by requiring deference when agencies are ideologically similar
to themselves and by discouraging it when agencies are not. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an
Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431 (1996). Recent data neither confirm nor refute the
hypothesis. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 657 (2004). All
jurisprudents, Hart and Dworkin included, reject such hypotheses, if on different grounds.
131. Compare Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the
Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002) (detailing the meandering evolution of Supreme Court doctrine on agency lawmaking authority), with
DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 12 (“A useful theory of an interpretive concept must itself be
an interpretation, which is very likely to be controversial, of the practice in which the concept figures.”).
132. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
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integrity objective is a mystery. Like the guidance EPA and the
Corps released to instruct their staffs in implementing Rapanos, it
seems best characterized as bureaucratic senescence.133
Recall that the most significant distinction of Dworkin’s jurisprudence from the more conventional accounts of positivism is his metaphysical realism, what is called his “right answer” thesis.134 Judges
subscribing to this philosophy view their own authority quite expansively. For all its confidence in Rapanos, though, the plurality did
nothing to advance Dworkin’s thesis. It did not at all justify its fear
for the dignity of states within statutes like the CWA. The obsession
with section 502(7)’s geography cannot really be about the intelligibility of denoting lands as “waters.”135 Statutes do worse to the language all the time. But, of course, when it comes to states’ dignity,
this Supreme Court has a history of raising Damocles swords, imminent storm clouds of constitutional trouble unnamed and formless,
that it says are threatening but which it will avoid by its interpretive
genius.136 Genius has its limits: no rationale for the result in Rapanos
seemed shallow or narrow enough for five votes. And in its “modesty,” the plurality shirked its responsibility to justify a finding of, or
even to explain what precisely had been, the agencies’ abuse of their
authority. Given section 101(a)’s text and what the agencies have
learned about aquatic ecosystems, this seems like a terrible oversight
on the plurality’s part. Whatever it is, it is not modesty. It is much
closer to caprice and the disregard of the obligation to render a
transparent judgment.137
Ecologists insist that two things still tightly coupled in the legal
imagination must be decoupled before we can pursue seriously the
restoration of nature’s integrity: geography and sovereignty. That is,
133. See Rapanos Guidance, supra note 52. Putting all engineered transfers beyond the
scope of the CWA makes their rehabilitation even more problematic, much as adopting
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test for headwaters and wetlands drives up the marginal costs of CWA section 404 regulation—a program that is already desperately underfunded. But cf. id. at 10-12.
134. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
135. The concept of navigable waters has long extended upland to a mean high water/tide line. See, e.g., Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-27 (1935). Depending on its calculation, this can mean a lot of “fast” land—including the most valuable
shore land. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 753 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
that “in tidal areas, ‘navigable waters of the United States,’ as used in the Rivers and Harbors Act, extend to all places covered by the ebb and flow of the tide to the mean high water (MHW) mark in its unobstructed, natural state”); see also Submerged Lands Act, ch.
65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (2000)). But cf. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2222 (2006) (“The plain language of the statute
simply does not authorize [the] ‘Land is Waters’ approach to federal jurisdiction.”).
136. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456-70 (1991).
137. See DWORKIN, supra note 75, at 73 (“We are modest, not when we turn our back
on difficult theoretical issues about our roles and responsibilities as people, citizens, and
officials, but when we confront those issues with an energy and courage forged in a vivid
sense of our fallibility.”).
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a truly expert approach to the CWA’s integrity mandate—and, thus,
to the concept of “waters of the United States”—would little resemble
what even the Rapanos dissent envisioned. For, by now, it would
have abandoned the strictly geographic interpretation of “waters of
the United States” and, by extension, sovereignty. With its deference
to resource-starved federal agencies that have pinioned themselves
into trying to govern massive territories comprising America’s major
watersheds,138 even Justice Stevens’ opinion dulled the sharpest
point of the integrity objective. Interpreting “waters of the United
States” to reach beyond geography and toward newer, cooperative
models of the jurisdiction to prescribe would necessarily acknowledge
the complexity and moral diversity that have engulfed the CWA’s restorative agenda and highlight the need for institutions better fit for
their challenges.139
Where nature is concerned, traditional conceptions of sovereignty
have been embarrassed by geographic boundaries time and again.
Too many lawyers remain blind to this basic truth, though, and that
mushrooming failure (of both theory and practice) was showcased in
Rapanos and Carabell. Unless they just have some unstated agenda
at odds with congressional objectives like CWA section 101(a),
though, the Justices need a better institutional imagination at
least.140 As matters stand, the Roberts Court seems poised to keep
compromising our law’s integrity as society experiments with ways to
restore and protect nature’s.

138. Cf. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2259 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“In final analysis . . . [w]hether the benefits of particular conservation measures outweigh their costs is a classic question of public policy that should not be
answered by appointed judges.”). The first case the dissent cites is Chevron, id. at 2252-53,
and deference is the key theme of the opinion.
139. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 875, 932 (2003) (“What [most twentieth-century legal theory] did not contemplate was
the possibility of new sorts of public institutions whose job it would be, not to resolve legal
ambiguity, but to foster continual deliberation and experimentation.”).
140. It would, in other words, recast the concept “waters of the United States” as a
catalyst for experimentation in the pursuit of the integrity ideal—not as a circular question of meaning dividing faction from faction. See id. at 972 (“To cooperate, of course, is not
necessarily to agree, and it is precisely for that reason that experimentalism—by imagining law as a pathway to cooperative problem solving rather than as a tool for adjudicating
conflicting claims—promises a path around the problem of moral diversity.”).

